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Abstract
We model the main arguments of the net neutrality debate in a
two-sided market framework with network congestion sensitive con-
tent providers and Internet consumers on each side, respectively. The
platform is controlled by a monopolistic Internet service provider, who
may choose to sell content providers prioritized access to its customers.
We explicitly consider the adverse effects of traffic prioritization to the
remaining best-effort class and find that network discrimination has
overall positive effects on welfare, because congestion is better allocated
to those content providers with congestion inelastic advertisement rev-
enues. In the long-run, network discrimination leads to infrastructure
investments in transmission capacity and encourages innovation on
the content provider side. In the short-run, however, discrimination
has no effect on innovation because the ISP expropriates the content
providers’ increased surplus through the price for priority access. This
is the downside of network discrimination: Albeit total welfare is in-
creased, content providers will–at least in the short-run–be worse off
than under network neutrality.
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1 Introduction
Without doubt, the Internet has become the central means of communica-
tions in almost all parts of the world and is virtually ubiquitously available,
even in very remote areas. The Internet’s popularity is in large due to the
sheer endless number of available applications and services. The Internet not
only accommodates all classical means of communications, such as telephony
and video, but also an increasing number of new innovative services. The
growing importance of the Internet is tightly intertwined with the innovations
it has put forth. These innovations include new communications technol-
ogy (e.g. instant messaging or video-on-demand), new business models (e.g.
online retailing) and new forms of social interaction (e.g. social network-
ing). It has been frequently argued1 that these innovations could only have
emerged because the Internet provides an open, standardized and above all
non-discriminatory platform. More precisely, the so-called end-to-end prin-
ciple has always been a major design principle of the Internet. It postulates
that all “intelligence” (e.g. new protocols) should be located at the edges of
the network (i.e. the sending and receiving end), while the backbone network
shall be kept dedicated to simply relaying data on a non-discriminatory basis
via the Internet protocol (IP). In particular, the end-to-end principle allows
for innovations at the edge of the network without requiring prior “consent”
of any party controlling the backbone network. In this spirit, the most radical
proponents of network neutrality oppose violations of the end-to-end prin-
ciple which may result in any sort of discrimination of data packets based
on their origin, destination or content type (cf. e.g. Crowcroft, 2007). Dis-
crimination of whatever sort is seen as a threat to the innovational spirit of
the Internet, because it would preclude a level playing field for providers of
new innovative services. There is a deep-grounded fear that innovation and
investment incentives of Internet start-ups would be negatively distorted or
even completely destroyed because well-established content providers could
buy themselves a preferred treatment of their data and thereby foreclose en-
try of new firms. Under this view, it is argued that some of the currently
successful services, such as peer-to-peer filesharing or voice-over-IP, would
not have been possible if the respective data packets were put at a disadvan-
tage to traffic from established content.
On the contrary, opponents of net neutrality comment that discrimina-
tion is a necessary means in order to be able to cope with the increasing
infrastructure requirements of new innovative services, e.g. with respect to
bandwidth and latency. In this sense, discrimination has a positive annota-
tion and might even be welfare enhancing, because it explicitly enables entry
1In particular by consumer rights groups, such as savetheinternet.com or
openinternetcoalition.com, and large content providers, such as Google, Yahoo and
eBay (cf. e.g. Google, 2009), but also by academics (e.g. Crawford, 2007).
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of those content providers who crucially hinge on bandwidth and latency re-
quirements which the traditional net neutral best-effort Internet cannot pro-
vide (in the future). Consequently, under this view net neutrality might even
hinder innovation, because innovative business models would be required to
be sustainable under the best-effort domain.
Of course the arguments are much more multi-layered than can be de-
scribed here. Many recent publications, especially from the law domain, have
attempted to cover the relevant facets of the net neutrality debate. More for-
mal analyses of the issue are rare, however. We attempt to isolate the formal
arguments in order to shed some light on the effect of network discrimination
on innovation and welfare.
The majority of Internet users pays a monthly fee, either as a flatrate
subscription or based on time or volume, for accessing content and services
on the Internet. Certainly, for each user the value of his Internet connection
increases with the availability of more content providers. However, generally
users are fairly reluctant to pay additionally for specific content or services
(Dou, 2004). The notion of a free-for-all Internet is still manifested deep
in the minds of many and roots in the not-for-profit history of the early
academically oriented Internet. Thus, for the most part content providers
rely on online advertisement in order to generate revenues from their service
offerings. Consequently, content providers value the presence of Internet
users, because they will generate revenues through clicks on advertisements.
More formally, we capture this scenario by considering Internet users
and content providers to be on one side of a two-sided market, respectively:
The presence of users on one side of the market generates positive network
externalities for content providers on the other side, and vice versa. Both
sides are connected through an Internet service provider (ISP) who “controls”
the market in the sense that he sets the terms of access for users and content
providers strategically. Users are always charged a flatrate for accessing the
Internet. Under a neutral network regime, with a single best-effort data
transmission service, the ISP does not charge the content provider in the
market. Under a discriminatory regime, the ISP offers the content providers
the additional option to buy priority access to the Internet for an extra
charge. The content providers who exercise this option will be provided with
a priority transmission service which enqueues request to their websites ahead
of those request to websites of content providers in the best-effort class.
We investigate the effects of such discriminatory practice in the short-run
and in the long-run. In the short-run, when the ISP’s transmission capacity
is fixed, network discrimination has at least two different effects.
On the one hand, speeding up some traffic will unmistakably lead to a re-
duction of average transmission speed in the best-effort class. Thus, those
content providers who are not willing to pay for priority access are put at a
disadvantage twice: First, from the speeding up of other providers’ content
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and second from the slowing down of their own content. This disadvantage
lies at the heart of the concern of network neutrality proponents.2
On the other hand, the business model of some content providers will be
more sensitive to transmission quality3 than that of other providers. For
example, a content provider who offers an on-demand video streaming ser-
vice is certainly more sensitive to network congestion than a simple e-mail
service provider. Consequently, when a content provider’s service cannot be
reliably offered such that the users’ experience is unsatisfactory, online ad-
vertisement revenues will decline, possibly up to the point where the content
provider is forced out of business. This argument is therefore in favor of net-
work discrimination, because it would actually allow for entry of innovative,
transmission quality demanding services.
Under some further assumptions, we formally investigate which one of the
two arguments has more impact under a discriminatory network regime. Our
main finding is that in the long-run network discrimination will lead to more
innovation. Furthermore, we compare the overall welfare effects of discrimi-
natory practice with respect to a network neutral regime and find that net-
work discrimination is generally welfare enhancing. This is because conges-
tion is better allocated to the congestion insensitive content providers, while
providing some congestion relief to the content providers with congestion sen-
sitive business models. However, in the short-run all content providers are
worse off under network discrimination because this efficiency gain is fully
appropriated by the ISP through the welfare-neutral priority charge.
Finally, we explicitly compare the ISP’s long-run incentive to invest into
infrastructure (i.e. transmission capacity) under both network regimes. On
the one hand, it can be argued that a network neutral regime provides the
best incentives for network investment, because ISPs can only charge users
higher prices for access if there is a wide variety of content available. Content
providers, on the contrary, will only be available if the best-effort transmis-
2In this paper we abstract from any form of direct service discrimination. Examples
for such anti-competitive behavior would be the actual case of mobile phone operators
blocking VoIP transmissions in their wireless networks (Hahn et al., 2007) or the degra-
dation of traffic flows of certain protocols, such as P2P, in backbones of large Internet
service providers. In our model every service provider can buy priority access on the
same conditions and discrimination does not correspond to exclusion of services based
on anticompetitive behavior. However, it shall be annotated that presently no generally
accepted definition of net neutrality exists. For example, at the other extreme end, some
net neutrality proponents regard only anti-competitive discrimination of specific services
as a violation to net neutrality. In this line, Tim Berners-Lee, founder and director of
the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) argues: “If I pay to connect to the Net with a
certain quality of service, and you pay to connect with that or greater quality of service,
then we can communicate at that level.” (Berners-Lee, 2006). In our view, which is in line
with the more formal literature, such practice would clearly violate net neutrality.
3For expositional simplicity, in the following we will often use “speed” or “congestion”
as a proxy for different transmission quality measures, such as bandwidth, latency or jitter.
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sion capacity is sufficient for their business models. Indeed, currently ISPs
generally engage in costly overprovisioning of transmission capacity in or-
der to accommodate for the most transmission-quality-demanding content
providers in peak times. On the other hand, it seems logical that ISPs have
an increased incentive to upgrade their infrastructure under a discriminatory
regime, because then they can make the most demanding content providers
pay for it.4 Again, there are arguments in favor of either regime and the
overall effect is unclear ex-ante. Our formal analysis reveals that ISPs have
a stronger incentive to invest into network infrastructure under a discrimi-
natory regime.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In Section 2 we
compare our model assumptions and results to related work. In Section 3
the formal model is laid out and in Section 4 the short-term effects of net-
work discrimination are considered. In Section 5 we investigate the long-term
effects of a discriminatory regime with respect to infrastructure investment
incentives. We conclude in Section 6 by summarizing our results and provid-
ing some policy advice.
2 Related Work
With only few notable exceptions, the net neutrality debate has thus far
been characterized by rather emotional and rhetorical publications, mostly
coming from the law domain (e.g. Faulhaber and Rasmussen, 2006; Yoo,
2005; Wu, 2005). Within the more formal strand of the literature, Choi
and Kim (2008) take an interesting approach by embodying standard results
from queuing theory, which allows them to precisely model the relationship
between priority and best-effort traffic. In our model, we will follow the
same approach. However, the focus of Choi and Kim differs from ours. The
authors investigate the effect of network discrimination among two compet-
ing content providers in a standard Hotelling model. It is assumed that
customers dislike congestion and visit one of the two content providers ex-
clusively. In reverse, the content providers can improve their competitive
position by purchasing priority access from a monopolistic ISP. The hitch is,
that the ISP will sell priority access only to one of the two content providers.
The authors have to make this unconventional assumption, because other-
wise the content providers engage in a prisoners’ dilemma such that both end
up purchasing the priority access: Clearly, individually each content provider
prefers the priority access if the other remains in the best-effort class. But
if both exercise this option neither gains an advantage and the price paid
4Even if transmission capacity is not extended, a discriminatory network regime might
still be welfare enhancing because it avoids some of the the wasteful overprovisioning by
alleviating congestion for the most demanding content providers when needed.
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for priority access is forfeited. Furthermore, in order to resolve the coordi-
nation problem which of the two content providers is awarded the priority
access, Choi and Kim assume cost asymmetry between the two competitors,
such that only the “low cost” provider can win the bargaining process with
the ISP. The authors find that the content provider with the priority access
obtains a larger market share and consumers have to pay a lower access fee
under the discriminatory regime. In the short-run the overall effect of dis-
crimination on welfare is ambiguous. On the one hand, consumers pay less
for network access, but on the other hand, overall Hotelling transportation
costs are higher. In the long-run, the ISP’s investment incentives are held in
check by two competing effects, which the authors call “rent extraction” and
“network access fee” effect. The rent extraction effect provides the ISP with
incentives to keep capacity scarce because this allows him to extract more of
the content providers’ rent. On the contrary, by the network access fee effect
the ISP would like to extend capacity, such that he can charge consumers
more for network access.
Economides and Tag (2008) analyze the effect of priority access in a net-
work discriminatory regime by considering a two-sided market model, very
much like ours. On one side of the market, there is a continuum of non-rivalry
content providers and, on the other side of the market, there is a continuum
of consumers. Each side experiences positive network externalities through
the presence of the other side. However, the authors do not consider a dis-
criminatory regime in the sense that some content providers are prioritized
over others. In their model, abandoning neutrality means that the platform
owner charges a lump-sum fee for access to his network. They find that for
a wide range of parameter values the incentives of the platform owner and
a social planner are not aligned. Charging content providers for access leads
to reduced market entry and consequently less externality to the consumer
side. This, in turn, leads to a lower access charge, such that more consumers
enter the market. The authors find that total welfare is higher under network
neutrality, because content providers are the only party loosing from aban-
doning neutrality. This finding carries over to an extension with two ISPs,
which makes them conclude that their results are robust under a certain level
of competition.
Finally, Hermalin and Katz (2007) model network neutrality in a two-
sided market as product line restrictions to the quality decision problem of
the ISP. In contrast to our results they find that net neutrality regulation
can drive out content providers from the market. Content providers who
purchased a low-quality variant from the ISP will be excluded if there is only
one single quality available. In their model, the overall welfare implications
of neutrality regulation are very often negative. However, the authors do not
check for investment incentives of the ISP and therefore the model is static
in its nature.
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Our model complements previous work in this strand of the literature
by explicitly considering the adverse effects of traffic prioritization to the
remaining best-effort class in a two-sided market model. Thereby, our focus is
to study the effect of network discrimination on innovation and infrastructure
investment.
3 The Model
We model the Internet as a two-sided market, with content providers (CP)
on one side and Internet consumers (IC) on the other side, each of which
value an increasing presence of the other side and dislike network congestion.
In order to be able to isolate the arguments of the net neutrality debate
we abstract from the full complexity of networks forming the Internet and
consider a single monopolistic Internet service provider (ISP) providing access
to consumers and content providers, respectively.
Internet service provider: The ISP controls the two-sided market
through a number of variables which he sets strategically. First, he charges
an access fee, a, from connected consumers. Under a network neutral regime,
the consumer access fee is the only source of revenue for the ISP. As will be
described below, both consumers and content providers dislike network con-
gestion. The level of network congestion is captured by consumers’ average
waiting time for content, w, which is again controlled by the ISP through
his choice of transmission capacity, µ. The ISP therefore faces the following
basic tradeoff: On the one hand, he has an interest to reduce congestion,
because this draws more content providers and consumers onto the platform,
which in turn increases revenues from access. On the other hand, an increase
of the participants on either side of the market will ceteris paribus increase
congestion, which can only be counteracted by a costly increase of trans-
mission capacity. Therefore, under a neutral network regime, ISP’s long-run
profit is5
ΠNl = αa− k(µ), (1)
where α and ∂k
∂µ
denote the share of consumers subscribing in equilibrium
and the marginal costs of capacity expansion, respectively.6 Under a dis-
criminatory network regime, the ISP has an additional source of revenue,
5Throughout this paper, the network neutral regime is indicated by the superscript N ,
whereas superscript D denotes the network discriminatory regime. Moreover, subscript s
and l denote short-run and long-run incentives, respectively.
6To ensure the existence of an interior solution to the ISP’s investment decision, we
assume a non-concave cost function, i.e. ∂k∂µ ≥ 0 and ∂
2k
∂µ2 ≥ 0
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which stems from selling priority access (i.e. access with lower congestion)
for a price of p to those content providers requiring it. More precisely,
ΠDl = αa+ βθ¯p− k(µ), (2)
where β is the share of content providers buying priority access and θ¯ denotes
the total mass of active content providers.
In the short-run, the ISP’s previous investment decisions into transmis-
sion capacity are sunk, so that µ can be considered an exogenous variable
which is irrelevant for profit maximization. Thus, short-run ISP profits are
ΠNs = αa (3)
ΠDs = αa+ βθ¯p. (4)
Content Providers: Whatever service content providers offer, they pro-
vide it for free and receive revenues only indirectly through online adver-
tisements.7 In the model, a content provider’s advertisement revenue will
depend on the gross advertisement revenue per unit of traffic, the average
received traffic per user, and the individual sensitivity of his business model.
Regarding the received traffic, we make two fundamental assumptions for
simplification of the analysis:8
• Each content provider receives the same traffic from each user, namely
L. This is independent of a content provider’s business model and
consequently its innate sensitivity to network congestion.
• Each content provider’s service is unique and therefore content
providers are not in direct competition for traffic. Each content
provider receives traffic of L per user, independent of the number of
other content providers currently in the market.
Although each content provider receives a gross traffic of L per user,
only a fraction of this can be turned into advertisement revenue. In online
advertisement this measure is known as the click-through-rate. We assume
that each content provider’s click-through-rate diminishes as network conges-
tion increases. Moreover, as argued before, each content provider’s business
model has an innate sensitivity to which extend network congestion affects
the click-through-rate. This individual congestion sensitivity is denoted by
θ and uniformly distributed on the unit interval. In summary, the advertise-
ment relevant portion of the gross network traffic is
L− θw, (5)
7In particular, this means that we rule out the possibility of content providers charging
consumers directly for access to their content.
8We will comment on the model’s sensitivity to these assumptions in Section 6.
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where w denotes the average level of network congestion when requesting the
content provider’s service. Moreover, as formula (5) can be interpreted as
the actual click-through-rate on advertisements, consider r as the revenue-
per-click. Then each content provider’s profit under net neutrality is
UNCP (θ) =
{
(L− θwN)rα if active
0 if inactive.
(6)
Notice, that a content provider’s profit will also depend on the overall level
of network congestion. In a discriminatory regime, differences in profit will
therefore depend on the change of congestion level and, if applicable, on the
additional price paid for priority treatment. Content providers’ profits in the
discriminatory regime are
UDCP (θ) =

(L− θwD1 )rα− p if active with priority service
(L− θwD2 )rα if active with best-effort service
0 if inactive.
(7)
As will be seen in detail later, it holds that wD1 < w
N < wD2 . Under a dis-
criminatory regime, the content provider who is indifferent between choosing
the priority and the best-effort transmission service is denoted by θ˜D. Fur-
thermore, in both regimes, the content provider who is indifferent between
becoming active and staying out of the market is characterized by a conges-
tion sensitivity of θ¯. Recall that θ is normalized to the unit interval, such
that θ¯ also reflects the mass of all active content providers. Thus, the share
of content providers choosing priority service under a discriminatory regime
is given by
β ≡ 1− θ˜
D
θ¯D
, (8)
for which obviously 0 < β < 1 must hold. Finally, see that the share of
consumers connected in equilibrium, α, generates positive externality on the
content providers’ profit.
Network Congestion: Network congestion is measured through the con-
sumers’ average waiting time following a content request. In particular, like
Choi and Kim (2008), we employ a M/M/1 queuing model to fix ideas on
the relationship between average waiting time, network traffic and capacity.9
9The M/M/1 queuing model assumes that (i) service requests arrive according to a
Poisson process (i.e. arrivals happen continuously and independently of one another), (ii)
service time is exponentially distributed (i.e. request coming from a Poisson process are
handled at a constant average rate) and (iii) that service requests are processed by a single
server. Furthermore it is assumed that the length of the queue as well as the number of
users is potentially infinite. This model is standard and considered to be a good proxy for
actual Internet congestion.
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Under a network neutral regime, i.e if all packets are treated equally indepen-
dent of origin or destination, the M/M/1 model predicts that each consumer
has an expected average waiting time of
wN =
1
µ− λ. (9)
Therein µ represents the average rate at which service requests are handled,
which is interpreted as the overall transmission capacity here; whereas λ
denotes the average rate at which consumers’ aggregate content requests
arrive at the ISP, which is interpreted as network traffic:
λ = αθ¯L,
i.e. network traffic will depend on the share of connected consumers, α, the
mass of available content providers, θ¯, and L, which denotes the average
traffic of each user per content provider.10 As explained before, we thereby
make two important assumptions concerning the generation of traffic on the
consumers side. First, each consumer generates more traffic as the number
of content providers increases. Second, traffic generation grows linearly with
the number of content providers.
Under a discriminatory regime, content providers are offered the choice
between a priority and a best-effort transmission service. In the M/M/1
model this translates to introducing an additional queue which handles the
request of the content providers in the priority class and which is processed
ahead of the queue for the best-effort class. In this vein, the classical results of
the M/M/1 queuing model represent the average waiting time in the priority
class, wD1 , and the best-effort class, w
D
2 :
11
wD1 =
1
µ− βλ (10)
wD2 =
µ
µ− λw
D
1 (11)
It is easy to see, that relation
wD1 < w
N < wD2 (12)
10More precisely, λ =
∫ α
y=0
∫ θ¯
x=0
L dx dy = αθ¯L. As will be seen later, the consumer side
will always be covered in equilibrium due to its homogeneity, i.e. α = 1 and thus gross
traffic will be λ = θ¯L.
11Remember that service providers are equally frequented by consumers and therefore
the proportion of providers buying priority access is determined by the waiting time in
the two service classes.
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is always fulfilled, assuming a fixed capacity µ and β < 1.12 This is an
important feature of our model, because it shows formally that serving some
content providers with priority will (in the short-run) unambiguously lead to
a degradation of service quality for the remaining content providers in the
best-effort class. These content providers are therefore put at a disadvantage
twice. First, through the prioritization of foreign traffic and second, through
the degradation of own traffic, compared to the network neutral regime.
Moreover, notice that the consumers’ average waiting time is independent
of the introduction of service classes,13 because each consumer will visit every
available content provider equally. Consumer requests to content providers
in the priority class will be processed within a time of wD1 , whereas request to
content providers in the best-effort class take wD2 units of time. Consequently,
average consumer waiting time is
wˆ = βwD1 + (1− β)wD2 = wD1
(
µ− βλ
µ− λ
)
= wN , (13)
since wD1 =
1
µ−βλ .
Consumers: Consumers are homogeneous and value basic connectedness
to the Internet as well as the presence of content providers. In particular,
we assume that connectedness adds a lump-sum utility of h whereas each
additional content provider adds a marginal utility of v to a consumer’s util-
ity.14 On the contrary, consumers dislike waiting for content due to network
congestion. This is captured through consumers’ average waiting time, wˆ.
To summarize, a consumer’s utility is given by
UIC =
{
h+ vθ¯ − cwˆ − a if connected
0 if not connected,
(14)
where c denotes consumer’s marginal opportunity costs in time and a the
access fee charged by the ISP.
Obviously, the homogeneity of consumers allows the ISP to extract all
consumer surplus in equilibrium by setting
a∗ = h+ vθ¯ − cwˆ. (15)
12For β = 1, when all content providers are in the first priority class, the model trivially
collapses to wD1 = w
N
13And independent of β for that matter.
14Recall that content providers are atomistic and consumers have no preference for
specific content. Thereby we avoid to make any judgment about the value of a specific
service innovation to consumers and assume that consumers whose rate of request per
content provider is L derive a utility of v from every content provider entering the market.
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As a convention, we will assume that in this case all consumers connect to
the ISP, such that
α∗ = 1. (16)
Notice, that the ISP’s revenue from consumer access will not directly depend
on the network regime because of (13). However, wˆ depends on the network
capacity, µ, which is under the ISP’s control, at least in the long-run. Fur-
thermore, content variety, θ¯, has a direct influence, as well as an indirect
influence via wˆ = 1
µ−θ¯L on the optimal access charge. Thus, under a network
neutral regime, the ISP’s challenge is to set the optimal capacity µ, which
will determine the congestion level and consequently content variety. Under
a discriminatory regime, the ISP must additionally select a strategic price,
p, at which he sells priority access to content providers.
4 Short-Run Effects of Network Discrimina-
tion
4.1 The Benchmark: Network Neutrality
Under network neutrality the platform offers only one transmission service
class and no content provider’s traffic is prioritized. As mentioned above, con-
tent providers are heterogeneous with respect to their sensitivity to network
congestion, but all of them rely on advertising revenue. Service providers are
arranged on the unit interval in order of ascending congestion sensitivity, θ.
Those, providers with θ close to zero offer a service with waiting time insen-
sitive advertisement revenues, whereas those with values of θ close to one are
very sensitive to network congestion. Since it will always be optimal for the
ISP to set the access price according to (15), all consumers will subscribe
and α = 1. Therefore, given the mass of active content providers and the
ISP’s transmission capacity,
wN =
1
µ− θ¯NL. (17)
Given this congestion level, content providers will enter the market until their
sensitivity to congestion is so severe that their business model is not sustain-
able anymore. Formally, the mass of active content providers in equilibrium
is derived by equating (6) with zero (the value of the outside option) while
substituting (9) and (16) to yield: 15
15To ensure an interior equilibrium on the number of active content providers, the
condition 0 ≤ L ≤ 1µ−L has to be satisfied. Intuitively, by formula (5) this upper-bound
on network traffic ensures that (at least) the most congestion sensitive content provider,
located at θ = 1 has a non-positive click-through-rate and will therefore never enter in
equilibrium.
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θ¯N
∗
=
Lµ
L2 + 1
(18)
Notice that an increase in network traffic per content provider, L, has an
adverse effect on network congestion and content variety:
∂wN
∂L
> 0 and
∂θ¯N
∂L
< 0
We denote this as the niveau effect. Furthermore, recall that under a network
neutral regime, the ISP makes only profits by selling access to consumers.
By substituting (9) and (18) into (15), one obtains the optimal access charge
and thus, by (3), the short-run ISP profit:
aN
∗
s = Π
N∗
s = h+
vLµ
L2 + 1
− c(L
2 + 1)
µ
(19)
Intuitively, it can be seen that the ISP’s short-run profit increases with net-
work capacity, µ. However, by the niveau effect, the ISP’s short-run profit
suffers from an exogenous increase of network traffic, L.
4.2 Network Discrimination
In a discriminatory network the ISP can alleviate congestion for those content
providers who have bought a priority access to users. According to (12), in
the short-run, when transmission capacity is fixed, the remaining providers
will be served at degraded best-effort access compared to the network neutral
regime. We may now distinguish three types of content providers:
1. CPs whose business model is relatively insensitive to network conges-
tion: They will remain in the free-of-charge best-effort class.
2. CPs whose business model is sufficiently sensitive to network conges-
tion: They will opt for priority access at a price of p.
3. CPs whose business model is extremely sensitive to network congestion:
They will be foreclosed from market entry and remain inactive.
The content provider indifferent between the first two cases is denoted
by θ˜D, whereas the content provider indifferent between the last two cases is
denoted by θ¯D. Obviously, it must hold that 0 < θ˜D < θ¯D.
Contrary to Choi and Kim (2008), in our model the “high cost” service
providers are more likely to opt for the priority class. This has two reasons:
First, we do not model the competitive aspect of obtaining a larger market
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share based on the prioritized connection. Second, in our model the incentive
to buy priority is based on the individual business model’s innate need for a
higher connection quality.
Formally, to determine θ˜D and θ¯D from (7), one must compute the fulfilled
expectations equilibrium by simultaneously considering the equations(
L− θ˜DwD2
)
r =
(
L− θ˜DwD1
)
r − p(
L− θ¯DwD1
)
r − p = 0
as well as (8), (10) and (11) to obtain
θ˜D
∗
=
pµ
L(L2 + 1)(Lr − p) =
p
(Lr − p)L2 θ¯
D∗ (20)
θ¯D
∗
=
Lµ
L2 + 1
. (21)
First, notice the intuitive result that θ˜D decreases as the individual traffic
volume, L increases, or likewise, as the price for priority transmission service,
p, decreases, meaning that more content providers will chose priority access
in both circumstances. Furthermore, comparing equation (21) with (18)
directly reveals that
θ¯D
∗
= θ¯N
∗
, (22)
which immediately proofs the following result.
Proposition 1 In the short-run, network discrimination has no effect on in-
novation. The number of active content providers does not change compared
to network neutrality, independent of the price for priority access.
With reference to the network neutrality debate this result has important
implications, because under the present assumptions the claims of both par-
ties are flawed in the short-run: Network discrimination will neither lead to
more, nor to less innovation. What is even more surprising is the fact that
the precise nature of the price for priority access is irrelevant.
Next, we investigate the ISP’s incentives to engage in network discrimi-
nation. From equation (12) we know that consumers’ average waiting time
is not affected by network discrimination. Furthermore, equation (22) shows
that also consumers’ network utility has not changed compared to the net-
work neutral regime. Therefore, in the short-run, the ISP cannot extract
extra rents from consumers and the optimal access charge is the same as
under net neutrality:
aD
∗
s = a
N∗
s (23)
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However, in a discriminatory regime the ISP can additionally extract rents
from content providers through the sales of priority access. In the short-run,
he will do so by maximizing βθ¯pD, which is achieved through
pD
∗
= Lr
(
1− 1√
L2 + 1
)
. (24)
It is easy to see that 0 < pD
∗
< Lr for all positive values of L and r.
Intuitively, this shows that through the sales of priority access, the ISP can
extract a fraction of each content provider’s gross advertisement revenue L r.
Thus, the ISP will make an extra profit of
∆ΠDs ≡ β θ¯D
∗
pD
∗
=
(
1− p
D∗
(Lr − pD∗)L2
)(
Lµ
L2 + 1
)
pD
∗
> 0 (25)
compared to the network neutral regime.
Proposition 2 The ISP has a short-run incentive to introduce a network
discriminatory regime, because this allows him to collect extra profits from
selling priority access to content providers. However, consumers pay the
same price for network access than under the network neutral regime.
Proposition 2 highlights that ISPs will indeed engage in network discrim-
ination when capacity is fixed. This result is supported by numerous ob-
servations of recent ISP practices, which have in fact triggered the network
neutrality debate in the first place. Among the most prominent examples is
Comcast, one of the largest U.S. Internet service providers, who was reported
to have engaged in discriminatory actions in late 2007 (Businessweek, 2008).
However, it must be annotated, that Comcast did not receive any payments
from content providers, at least officially, in order to accelerate or slow down
certain types of traffic. Nevertheless, the incentives to do so are certainly
very real and soon money will be changing hands if network discrimination
is not prevented by regulatory bodies.
4.3 Welfare Analysis
In order to provide useful insights for the current policy debate, we conclude
the short-run analysis of network discrimination by investigating the welfare
effects. In the present context, total short-run welfare, Ws, is constituted by
three different elements: (i) Internet consumers’ surplus, ICSs, (ii) content
providers’ surplus, CPSs, and (iii) the ISP’s profit, Πs:
Ws = ICSs + CPSs + Πs (26)
With respect to Internet consumers’ surplus, it has been shown that
ICSs = 0 in both regimes, because consumers are homogeneous and thus
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the ISP can always extract their surplus fully. Regarding the ISP’s profit,
we established that ∆ΠDs > 0. Therefore, it remains to examine the effect of
discrimination on content providers’ surplus.
Figure 1: The Effect of Network Discrimination on Content Providers’ Sur-
plus
Consider Figure 1. First, notice that those content providers located at
θ ∈ [0, θ˜D) are evidently worse off under a discriminatory regime, because
for them network congestion has increased from wN to wD2 . Second, the
content providers’ welfare loss increases with congestion sensitivity on the
interval θ ∈ [0, θ˜D). The business model of the provider located at θ = 0
is not affected at all through congestion, while the provider at θ = θ˜D is
already suffering so much, that he is indifferent between staying in the best-
effort class and buying priority access. Third, by the converse argument,
notice that the welfare loss is decreasing for those content providers in the
priority class as θ ∈ [θ˜D, θ¯) increases. To see this, recall from Proposition 1
that the last content provider to enter the market, θ¯, is identical under both
regimes and receives a surplus of zero. For him, the benefit through reduced
congestion (compared to the network neutral regime) is just offset by the
price for priority access. Consequently, for all content providers with less
congestion sensitivity, i.e. θ ∈ [θ˜D, θ¯), the price is higher than the benefit
of being in the priority class. Nevertheless, by definition of θ˜D, for these
providers the welfare loss is yet less severe in the first priority class than
in the best-effort class. In this line of argumentation, it is also obvious
that content provider θ˜D incurs the greatest welfare loss. In summary, we
can conclude that in the short-run all active content providers are worse off
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under a discriminatory network regime.
Note that the charge for priority access is merely a welfare shift from
the content providers to the ISP, so that the sign of the net welfare effect,
∆Ws, will only depend on the difference between the gross gain through less
congestion of those content providers in the priority class and the gross loss
through increased congestion of those providers remaining in the best-effort
class.
∆Ws = ∆Π
D
s +
(
UDCP − UNCP
)
= βθ¯pD +
(∫ θ¯
θ=0
UDCP (θ) dθ −
∫ θ¯
θ=0
UNCP (θ) dθ
)
= βθ¯pD︸ ︷︷ ︸
priority
charge
+ r(wN − wD1 )
∫ θ¯
θ=θ˜
θ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion alleviation
to priority class
− r(wD2 − wN)
∫ θ˜
θ=0
θ dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion aggravation
to best-effort class
−
∫ θ¯
θ=θ˜
pD dθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
priority
charge
=
r
2
[
(wN − wD1 )(θ¯2 − θ˜2)− (wD2 − wN)θ˜2
]
(27)
Equation (27) reveals nicely that the overall effect of network discrimi-
nation on welfare indeed depends on the relative size of the congestion ag-
gravation effect to providers in the best-effort class versus the congestion
alleviation effect to providers in the priority class. Obviously, the two effects
relate directly to the main argument of proponents and opponents of net
neutrality, respectively. This is exemplified in Figure 2.
Proposition 3 In the short-run, network discrimination unambiguously in-
creases welfare with respect to the network neutral regime, because congestion
is alleviated for the most congestion sensitive content providers in lieu of the
less congestion sensitive content providers. However, all content providers
are worse off under a discriminatory regime because the increased surplus is
expropriated by the ISP.
Proof:
∆Ws > 0 ⇔ w
N − wD1
wD2 − wN
>
θ˜2
θ¯2 − θ˜2 ⇔
1− β
β
>
(1− β)2
1− (1− β)2 ⇔ 0 < β < 1 
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Figure 2: Congestion Alleviation vs. Congestion Aggravation Effect of Net-
work Discrimination
Network discrimination will therefore generally be welfare improving in
the short-run, because it “allocates” congestion more efficiently. Those con-
tent providers who are relatively inelastic to congestion with respect to their
advertisement revenues are allocated more congestion than the providers with
relatively congestion elastic revenues.
5 Long-Run Effects and Infrastructure In-
vestment Incentives
In this section we extend our model to allow for long-run investments in
network transmission capacity. Much of the neutrality debate is rooted in
the ISPs’ concerns about infrastructure investments. On the one hand, ISPs
would like to accommodate for new innovative content because this is valued
by customers. But, on the other hand, they do not want to let the content
providers free-ride on their infrastructure investments. Therefore, network
discrimination seems to be a plausible way out of this dilemma.
5.1 Transmission Capacity and Congestion
We now focus our analysis on the average service rate, µ, which is inter-
preted as a proxy for transmission capacity. An increase of µ allows the ISP
to handle more service requests to content providers simultaneously. Since all
available customers are always connected in equilibrium, capacity expansion
18
can only generate extra profits on the consumer side through the indirect
effects of increased service variety and reduced congestion. Both effects orig-
inate on the content provider side. In particular, we can distinguish three
effects:
• The expansion effect denotes that an increase of capacity reduces the
overall congestion level and thereby allows for the emergence of new
innovative content providers.
• The congestion effect, on the contrary, indicates the negative feedback
loop of the expansion effect on congestion. The entry of new content
providers generates higher network traffic, since customers visit all con-
tent providers equally, which in turn increases congestion.
• Likewise, recall that an increase in network traffic can also be achieved
via the niveau effect by which an increase of L has adverse effects on
content variety and network congestion.
In either regime the overall direction of these effects depends crucially on
the ISP’s optimal choice of µ. Formally, we model the investment decision as
a discrete decision stage which precedes the previous analysis. Thus, the ISP
chooses first its transmission capacity, µ, and then, in a second stage, the
customer access charge, a, together with, the priority price p, if applicable.16
5.2 Network Neutrality
Recall from the short-run analysis that under a network neutral regime, the
network operator makes profits from selling consumer access only. He cap-
tures the full consumer surplus, but does not tap content providers’ surplus.
This does not change in the long-run. The ISP may therefore only increase
his revenue through the expansion effect and reaping consumers’ additional
externality for content variety. Given the optimal access charge from (15),
the choice of optimal infrastructure investment will be determined at the
point where the marginal revenue MRN from capacity expansion equals the
marginal costs MC ≡ ∂k(µ)
∂µ
. The marginal revenue can be written as follows:
MRN =
vLµ
(L2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variety
incentive
+
c(L2 + 1)
µ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion avoidance
incentive
(28)
Intuitively, the ISP chooses a higher transmission capacity if consumer’ op-
portunity costs in time, c, are high. We call this the congestion avoidance
16Accordingly, the solution concept is that of subgame perfectness.
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incentive of infrastructure investment. Waiting costs directly reduce the pos-
sible access charge which the platform can extract from the users. The same
intuition holds for the value of variety, v. Therefore, we call this the variety
incentive. In fact, if v is very large, the ISP could have an excessive incentive
to invest into capacity.17
5.3 Network Discrimination
In a network discriminatory regime, the entry of additional content providers
not only increases the ISP’s revenues from access, but also revenues from pri-
ority sales. The necessary infrastructure upgrades caused by increased traffic
through the entry of additional content providers can therefore be easier
compensated. Given the equilibrium values of a and p from the short-run
analysis, the ISP decides about network investments based on the marginal
revenue of capacity expansion.
MRD =
vLµ
(L2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
variety
incentive
+
c(L2 + 1)
µ2︸ ︷︷ ︸
congestion
avoidance
incentive
+
(
1− p
D∗
(Lr − pD)L2
)
pDL
(L2 + 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
priority revenue incentive
(29)
It is immediately obvious that the ISP has an additional incentive to increase
capacity under network discrimination, which we thus call the priority rev-
enue incentive. Compared to the neutral network regime, the ISP will there-
fore invest more into infrastructure and provide higher transmission capacity.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the ISP will also earn greater profits under a
discriminatory regime.
Proposition 4 Under a discriminatory regime the ISP will invest more in
network infrastructure and provide higher transmission capacity in the long-
run. Thereby, ISP profit, consumer access charge and content variety are
higher than under a network neutral regime.
5.4 Welfare and Regulation
From the short-run welfare analysis, it is obvious that the general level of
network congestion is crucial in driving the welfare effects.
Proposition 5 Under the network discriminatory regime, the overall con-
gestion level is reduced compared to network neutrality. The already posi-
tive short-run welfare effects of network discrimination are therefore even
increased in the long-run.
17This could happen with linear costs of capacity expansion. Under a convex cost
function, infinite capacity expansion can never be optimal.
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Proof: It remains to verify that ∂w
∂µ
=
∂ 1
µ−λ
∂µ
< 0: First, see that λ = θ¯L =
L2µ
L2+1
, so that ∂λ
∂µ
= L
2
L2+1
< 1. Therefore, it holds that ∂(µ−λ)
∂µ
> 0 and
consequently,
∂ 1
µ−λ
∂µ
< 0 
However, the fact remains that most of the welfare gain is appropriated
by the ISP. This is the downside of network discrimination. Once a dis-
criminatory network regime is established, the question will therefore arise if
price regulation could enable content providers to retain more of their sur-
plus. Assume a regulatory agency would lower the price for prioritized traffic
under the level which the monopolistic platform owner has chosen according
to (24). Certainly, this would result in more content providers subscribing
to the priority service, which in turn increases the average waiting time for
consumers using priority services and even more for consumers using the
best-effort services. It is easy to verify that price regulation would indeed
shift some of the surplus back from the ISP to the content providers. Unfor-
tunately, when applying price regulation, the regulator also destroys welfare,
because the ISP’s revenues from priority access are in fact welfare neutral
transfers. In the most extreme case, price regulation could impose a price
of pR = 0, which would de facto reestablish the network neutral regime. By
Proposition 3 and 5 this cannot be welfare optimal. In fact, in the present
model a welfare maximizing regulator has the same incentives as the platform
owner. To see this consider (27) and derive the optimal price as well as the
optimal investment incentives of a regulator. Solving ∂∆W
∂p
= 0 for p reveals
that the welfare maximizing priority price is equal to the price choosen by
the platform owner: pR
∗
= pD
∗
. Solving ∂∆W
∂µ
shows the same result holds
for the optimal capacity.
Proposition 6 Under a discriminatory network regime a welfare maximiz-
ing regulator has the same investment incentives as the platform owner.
Therefore, price regulation under the desired level of the platform will in-
evitably lead to welfare reductions.
6 Conclusion
We contribute to the net neutrality debate with a formal framework that
incorporates Internet consumers, content providers and an Internet service
provider. Our model complements previous work in this strand of the liter-
ature by explicitly considering the adverse effects of traffic prioritization to
the remaining best-effort class in a two-sided market model. Thereby, our
focus is to study the effect of network discrimination on innovation of content
providers and the ISP’s incentives for transmission infrastructure investment.
Generally, we find that network discrimination has positive effects on
welfare, because congestion is better allocated among content providers with
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different sensitivity to network congestion. Those content providers with
congestion inelastic advertisement revenues remain with the free best-effort
transmission service, in which they experience more congestion than under
network neutrality. Conversely, those content providers with relatively con-
gestion elastic ad revenues are alleviated from congestion and thereby gen-
erate overall welfare gains. In the long-run, network discrimination leads to
infrastructure investments in transmission capacity and encourages innova-
tion. In the short-run, however, innovation is not expected because the ISP
expropriates the increased content provider surplus through the price for the
priority transmission service. This is the downside of network discrimina-
tion. Although total welfare is increased, content providers will–at least in
the short-run–be worse off than under network neutrality.
Although price regulation can shift some of the congestion alleviation
gains back to content providers, it is inapt as a policy instrument, because
welfare is proportionally destroyed in the process. Therefore, if regulatory
correction is desired, it should address the expansion of transmission capacity
directly, e.g. by subsidizing broadband roll-out.
To provide a benchmark for future research, we made the fundamental as-
sumption that content providers are not in competition with each other and
that they are equally visited by customers. We believe that our results are
fairly robust to small variations of this assumption. For example, one could
incorporate competition by assuming that content providers’ revenue-per-
click depends on the congestion level also. Furthermore, also the consumers’
utility function could consider the improved performance of congestion sen-
sitive services due to prioritization. In both cases the relative advantage of
network discrimination would be merely amplified.
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